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In recent years the historiography of mass incarceration – the systematic state imprisonment 
of millions of Americans, largely poor and of colour – has expanded dramatically. Until 
Julilly Kohler-Hausmann’s Getting Tough, however, few works have considered the interplay 
between the rapid and historically unprecedented expansion of the “carceral state” since the 
late 1960s and the concurrent retrenchment, even evisceration, of welfare provision during 
the same period.  
 
Getting Tough explores this interaction through three state-level case studies: drug addiction, 
welfare, and sentencing. In response to a wider “crisis” of state legitimacy during the 1970s – 
economic dislocation, social and cultural change, insurgent social movements, perceptions of 
national decline – and the diminishing consensus behind prevailing “rehabilitative” policies, 
political elites “got tough” via newly punitive, muscular approaches to social problems. New 
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller abandoned his commitment to drug treatment and instead 
proposed draconian penalties which promised life sentences for those selling hard drugs. In 
California and Illinois, legislators grappling with enlarged welfare rolls enlisted penal 
institutions in the provision of AFDC, attaching work mandates, criminal sanctions and anti-
fraud operations to existing welfare administration. Again in California, “law and order” 
politicians and law enforcement lobbies hijacked efforts to repeal the indeterminate sentence, 
instituting a new, politicised sentencing regime which while fixing prison terms also steadily 
increased them. As Kohler-Hausmann makes clear, these decisions were not reactive 
responses to policy failure, a rightward shift amongst the electorate, or endemic cultures or 
pathologies within communities; in fact, they often created these trends. Instead they 
represented conscious, strategic choices in which elites glimpsed solutions to the crisis of 
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state legitimacy and thus considerable ‘political dividends’ (p. 118), despite the limited 
programmatic success of their initiatives. 
 
Yet “getting tough” was not simply an elite project. One of the book’s major contributions is 
to illustrate, through examination of constituents’ correspondence, prisoners’ newspapers or 
advocacy groups such as California’s Law and Order Campaign Committee, the ‘dialogical’ 
(p. 250) interaction between elite and grassroots agency, often amplified by pervasive media 
discourses, which incentivised the punitive shift. Nor was “getting tough” wholly novel. In 
another contribution, the book identifies the commonalities between the old policy regime 
and the new, revealing how “treatment-based” drug programmes or rehabilitative penal 
approaches also called upon coercion and criminalisation, while new policy solutions utilised 
age-old cultural tropes and constructs, many of them based around race and gender, to 
develop their legitimacy: the black or Latino “pusher”; the “welfare queen”; the “soft” or 
“permissive” quality of the welfare state. Kohler-Hausmann’s disentangling of these 
continuities helps historians to understand why the construction of a new ‘common sense’ (pp. 
12-13) regarding drugs, crime and welfare could take place so rapidly. 
 
But Getting Tough also excels in situating itself within even larger narratives. For Kohler-
Hausmann, debates over drugs, welfare and punishment served as a ‘terrain’ (p. 122) for 
wider contestations over rights, citizenship, expertise and authority, and the role of the state 
during the 1970s. Getting Tough illustrates the genesis of a zero-sum competition over rights, 
with the extension of rights to some painted as a profound loss for others – a theme also 
evident in contemporaneous conflicts over school busing or affirmative action. It identifies 
new, normative visions of citizenship which sought to resolve struggles over who the state 
should serve by opposing a “productive”, “tax-paying” or “law-abiding” citizenry against a 
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deviant “underclass” of criminals, drug addicts and welfare recipients. As Kohler-Hausmann 
argues, the Rockefeller drug laws, restrictive welfare reforms and mandatory sentencing each 
represented an effort to ‘symbolically and physically exile’ (p. 287) the latter from the former 
– an opposition memorably captured in the opening to Time’s 1977 cover article on “The 
Underclass” – and strip them of their ability to make claims on the state. The book also 
reveals the shifting locus of expertise and authority, away from social or medical science – 
and even the addict or prisoner – to the crime victim, the legislator, the “citizen”, and the 
reification of individual or cultural explanations for social problems. Perhaps most 
powerfully, Getting Tough illuminates the changing role of the state itself: no longer a 
therapeutic entity, responsible for integrating marginalised individuals and communities into 
society and the polity, but a protector or punisher, responsible for disciplining, segregating or 
excluding such groups via “tough” policies of surveillance, quarantine and stigmatisation. For 
Kohler-Hausmann, this ‘toughness imperative’ (p. 209), forged within the wider crisis of the 
1970s, has since become hegemonic in both state and national politics. 
 
In places, the agency of national policy debates in Getting Tough is implicit rather than 
explicit. While Kohler-Hausmann is correct to argue that state and local governments 
retained responsibility for crime and welfare and state-level struggles served to transform 
federal policy (pp. 24-25), the reciprocal role of Washington in these areas is surely of note. 
Rather than simply responding to state-level developments, did national government not offer 
further political or fiscal incentives for “getting tough” locally – LEAA monies, victims’ 
rights initiatives, Gerald Ford’s sponsorship of mandatory sentencing? Despite its claims to 
examine welfare and punishment as ‘intertwined’ (p. 2) and ‘integrated systems’ (p. 9), the 
book’s tripartite structure – examining drugs, welfare and sentencing in turn – perhaps 
militates against attempts to assess institutional integration. And the book’s foregrounding of 
4 
 
the construction of the “problem” of drugs, welfare or sentencing ahead of those problems’ 
political or policy resolution has the effect of making “getting tough” – and the punitive turn 
more broadly – seem rather less ‘creative’ (p. 290), and rather more reactive, than Kohler-
Hausmann, not to mention other scholars such as Vesla Weaver, have suggested elsewhere. 
 
Nonetheless, Getting Tough is an outstanding and powerful book, not only in its attempt to 
interweave transformations in both the welfare state and penal system in the late twentieth 
century, but in its ability to elucidate the broader implications of these changes for the 
American polity and society. It tells us that, just as political elites chose “toughness” in the 
1970s, we also have a choice today. At a time in which citizenship norms are again up for 
negotiation, against a backdrop of economic inequality, social instability, vocal demands 
from marginalised groups, and political leadership which eschews integration in favour of 
exclusion and “tough talk”, this choice is more relevant, and important, than ever.  
 
Joe Merton 
University of Nottingham 
 
